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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
We decide two issues in this appeal: first, whether the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may bring a parallel 
enforcement action against Navient Corporation and Navient 
Solutions, LLC (together, “Navient”) under the Consumer 
Financial Protection Act of 2010 (the “Consumer Protection 
Act”), codified in relevant part at 12 U.S.C. § 5552, after the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “Bureau”) has 
filed suit; and second, whether and to what extent the federal 
Higher Education Act of 1965 (the “Education Act”), 20 
U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., preempts the Commonwealth’s loan-
servicing claims under its Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Law (the “PA Protection Law”), 73 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. §§ 201-1 to 201-9.3.  
We hold that the plain language of the Consumer 
Protection Act permits the Commonwealth’s concurrent 
action.  And we follow our sister Circuits in holding that 
although the preemption provision of the Education Act 
preempts claims based on failures to disclose information as 
required by the statute, it does not preempt claims based on 
affirmative misrepresentations.  See Lawson-Ross v. Great 
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Lakes Higher Educ. Corp., 955 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2020); 
Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 639, 
642 (7th Cir. 2019).  Cf. Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936 (9th 
Cir. 2010).  As the Commonwealth’s claims under the PA 
Protection Law based on affirmative misrepresentations and 
misconduct are not preempted, we affirm the District Court’s 
denial of Navient’s motion to dismiss. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background 
Congress enacted the Education Act in order “to keep 
the college door open to all students of ability, regardless of 
socioeconomic background.”  Bible v. United Student Aid 
Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation 
omitted).  To that end, the Act established two federal student 
loan programs that are designed to help every student afford 
the college or trade school of his or her choice: (i) the Direct 
Loan Program, under which the Department of Education (the 
“DOE”) lends federal taxpayer dollars directly to student 
borrowers, see 20 U.S.C. § 1087a et seq.; and (ii) the Federal 
Family Education Loan Program (the “Indirect Loan 
Program”), under which the federal Government guarantees 
privately funded loans to student borrowers, see 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1071 et seq. 
The federal Government does not directly administer 
these loan programs.  The DOE contracts with third parties like 
Navient to administer and service loans under the Direct Loan 
Program and imposes contractual requirements that govern 
what servicers may do when acting on the DOE’s behalf.  For 
both Direct Loan Program and Indirect Loan Program loans, 
the DOE has promulgated comprehensive regulations that 
control the student loan process, including the types of charges 
that are permitted, see 34 C.F.R. § 682.202; the kinds of 
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repayment plans that are available, see §§ 682.209, 685.208; 
and the ways in which those plans can be restructured, see 
§§ 682.210–11, 685.204–05. 
 Federal student loans are eligible for several types of 
deferred payment plans to help borrowers avoid defaulting.  
Servicers may grant a “forbearance” to borrowers having 
financial trouble during the repayment period.  This “permit[s] 
the temporary cessation of payments, allowing an extension of 
time for making payments, or temporarily accepting smaller 
payments than previously were scheduled.”  § 682.211(a)(1).  
The DOE’s regulations specify the circumstances under which 
a loan servicer may offer forbearance.  See, e.g., 
§§ 682.211(a)(2), 685.205.  Borrowers who enter forbearance 
face significant costs, such as, among other things, having their 
monthly payments increase due to accumulated unpaid 
interest. 
DOE regulations dictate how loan issuers and servicers 
must communicate with borrowers about forbearance.  Lenders 
and servicers must make extensive disclosures, including those 
related to fees and repayment options, at many stages of a 
loan’s lifecycle: “before disbursement,” 20 U.S.C. § 1083(a); 
“before repayment,” § 1083(b); “during repayment,” 
§ 1083(e); to “a borrower having difficulty making payments,” 
§ 1083(e)(2); and to “a borrower who is 60 days delinquent in 
making payments on a loan,” § 1083(e)(3).  Before placing 
borrowers into forbearance, loan servicers must disclose its 
terms, including that deferred interest will be capitalized.  See 
§§ 1083(a)(6)(B), 1083(e)(2); see also § 1087e(p); 34 C.F.R. 
§ 682.211.  Servicers must repeat that disclosure within 30 
days of granting forbearance and must disclose every 180 days 
during the forbearance period.  See §§ 1083(b), 1087e(p); 34 
C.F.R. § 682.211(e)(2). 
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In addition to forbearance, loan servicers offer an array 
of alternate repayment plans, referred to as Income-Driven 
Repayment (“IDR”) plans, when borrowers encounter 
difficulties during the repayment period, each with varying 
qualification requirements and repayment provisions plans.  
Borrowers who enter an IDR plan do not defer payments 
entirely but instead adjust their monthly payments.  To qualify 
for IDR, borrowers must fill out a federal application, submit 
supporting documents, and then recertify their income and 
family size annually.  34 C.F.R. §§ 682.215(e), 685.221(e). 
As with forbearance, federal law details what, when, 
and how loan servicers must communicate with borrowers 
regarding the availability of IDR.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(p); 
34 C.F.R. § 682.205(e).  Once repayment begins, if “a 
borrower . . . has notified the lender that the borrower is having 
difficulty making payments,” the servicer must provide a 
written disclosure “in simple and understandable terms” that 
details both the expected costs associated with forbearance if 
the borrower chooses that option, and instructions for seeking 
IDR if a student borrower seeks an alternative to forbearance.  
20 U.S.C. § 1083(e)(2) (Indirect Loan Program); see also 
§ 1087e(p) (Direct Loan Program).1 
 
1 In addition, among other disclosures, federal law requires 
lenders and loan servicers to disclose: the availability of IDR 
when the loan is disbursed and before repayment begins, 
§§ 1083(a)(11), (b)(6); 34 C.F.R. § 682.205(a)(2)(xii) (Indirect 
Loan Program); § 1087e(p) (Direct Loan Program); the 
availability of, and procedures for enrolling in, IDR before 
repayment begins, 20 U.S.C. § 1077(a)(2)(H); 34 C.F.R. 
§ 682.205(e) (Indirect Loan Program); 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1087e(d)(1)(D)–(E), 1087e(p) (Direct Loan Program); and 
the specified information regarding IDR on every statement 
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DOE regulations also require that loan servicers provide 
oral disclosures regarding forbearance and IDR at other times.  
When a defaulted borrower orally requests a forbearance, the 
servicer must “orally review with the borrower the terms and 
conditions of the forbearance, including the consequences of 
interest capitalization, and all other repayment options 
available to the borrower,” and must send a written notice with 
similar information.  34 C.F.R. §§ 682.211(d)(iii), 
685.205(a)(8).  DOE regulations do not require federal loan 
servicers to disclose the availability of IDR on each phone call.  
Federal law does require that multiple written or electronic 
notices and disclosures be provided to borrowers, including 
with each bill or statement.  20 U.S.C. §§ 1083(e)(1) (Indirect 
Loan Program), 1087e(p) (Direct Loan Program).   
The Education Act grants the DOE broad discretion to 
regulate these loan programs, see, e.g., § 1082(a)(1), and 
expressly requires the DOE to “prescribe standardized forms 
and procedures regarding” deferments, forbearance, and 
servicing, § 1082(I)(1)(D)–(F).  These standardized procedures 
must “include all aspects of the loan process,” § 1082(I)(2)(A), 
“be designed to minimize administrative costs and burdens,” 
id., and standardize and simplify procedures related to 
servicing, § 1082(I)(3)(A).2  
 
sent to the borrower, including “a reminder that the borrower 
has the option to change repayment plans,” and a link to the 
DOE’s IDR website, 20 U.S.C. § 1083(e)(1)(I); 34 C.F.R. 
§ 682.205(a)(3)(ix) (Indirect Loan Program); § 1087e(p) 
(Direct Loan Program). 
 
2 In the last decade, the federal Government considered 
steps to promote awareness of IDR.  For example, a 2012 
Presidential Memorandum noted that “too few borrowers are 
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B. Navient’s Conduct  
1. Loan-Originating Related Conduct  
Navient has been “engaged in trade and commerce by 
offering, selling, marketing and promoting student loans to 
borrowers and by servicing and collecting on borrowers’ 
student loans.”  App. 105.3  From 2004 until 2014, Navient’s 
predecessors also were engaged in that business.4 
 
aware of the options available to them to help manage their 
student loan debt, including reducing their monthly payment 
through [IDR] . . . .”  See The White House, June 7, 2012 
Memorandum on Improving Repayment Options for Federal 
Student Loan Borrowers, 77 Fed. Reg. 35,241 (June 13, 2012), 
https://tinyurl.com/y5o39q4z.  In July 2016, the DOE proposed 
that federal regulations should be amended to require that 
federal loan servicers employ “staff who receive enhanced 
training related to repayment and forgiveness options,” and 
who in turn would (A) “assess the borrower’s long-term and 
short-term financial situation and consider all available 
information about the borrower’s income and family size,” and 
(B) “discuss the concept of [IDR] plans” with struggling 
borrowers.  DOE, Policy Direction on Federal Student Loan 
Servicing (July 20, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/yxnkrava.  In 
2017, however, the DOE decided not to implement the 
proposed regulatory changes.  See Letter from Secretary of 
Education re Student Loan Servicer Recompete (Apr. 11, 
2017), https://tinyurl.com/y2v2m8uq.  
 
3 The alleged facts recounted herein are drawn from the 




Until 2007, many school financial aid offices 
maintained a preferred lenders list to give students guidance in 
choosing between different lenders.  Navient attempted to 
place itself at the top of those lists to obtain access to schools’ 
potential borrowers.  Navient marketed custom loan packages 
to schools, including Indirect Loan Program loans, private 
loans for borrowers who qualified for Navient’s standard 
private student loan products (“prime loans”), and private loans 
for students who did not qualify for standard private student 
loans (“subprime loans”).  This benefited schools by 
maximizing enrollment and Navient by giving it a greater share 
of the market.   
Subprime loans typically had high variable interest rates 
and high origination fees.  Student borrowers who took out 
subprime loans were not informed that the loans were part of a 
subprime lending program and had a high likelihood of default.  
Navient internally described this strategy as “Current Strategy 
is Working: ––Use subprime to win school deals and secure 
[Indirect Loan Program] and standard private volume––View 
economics on an all-in basis.”  App. 119.  A 2007 internal 
email describes one of Navient’s subprime loan programs as 
“the baited hook to gain [Indirect Loan Program] volume.”  
App. 119. 
Navient allegedly loosened its required credit criteria so 
that subprime borrowers could qualify without knowing the 
 
4 In 2014, Navient assumed the liabilities of its 
predecessors—SLM Corporation and Sallie Mae, Inc.—and 
took over their student loan servicing and debt collection 
business.  The action against Navient includes conduct by 
those predecessors.  For convenience, we refer to Navient, 
rather than its predecessors, during the time periods the latter 
entities were involved.   
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true risk of default.  Between 2000 and 2006 there was a 
substantial increase in the number of high-risk subprime loans 
made by Navient to students attending schools with a less than 
a 50% graduation rate and to students with credit scores of less 
than 640.  From 2000 to 2007, between 68% and 87% of 
Navient’s high-risk loans defaulted.5   
2. Loan Servicing-Related Conduct  
a. Navient Allegedly Steered 
Borrowers into Forbearance.  
Navient allegedly has encouraged borrowers repeatedly 
to communicate with its representatives for assistance, only to 
steer them into forbearance rather than more affordable 
alternatives like IDR plans.  The Commonwealth argues that 
this was done because enrolling a borrower in forbearance can 
be completed in a few minutes without paperwork, while 
enrolling in an IDR plan requires the submission of paperwork 
 
5 In their Amicus Curiae brief, New York and its joining 
States allege widespread abuses by servicers like Navient that 
have harmed millions of borrowers by impeding their access to 
IDR plans and public-service loan-forgiveness programs.  For 
example, an investigation by Illinois into Navient found that it 
routinely steered consumers into forbearances rather than IDR 
plans.  California alleges that Navient misled struggling 
borrowers about the amount needed to bring their accounts 
current and induced them into making unnecessarily high 
payments.  California, Washington, and Mississippi have sued 
Navient for these and other deceptive practices.  The Attorneys 
General for Colorado, Kansas, Oregon, New Jersey, New 
York, and the District of Columbia have also issued civil 
investigative demands to Navient.  Amicus Curiae Br. for 
States of New York et al. 7–13. 
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and annual recertification, and Navient representatives were 
compensated based on average call time.  Hence enrolling 
borrowers in IDR plans was costly.   
Navient allegedly enrolled many borrowers into 
multiple consecutive forbearances even though they had 
demonstrated a long-term inability to repay their loans.  For 
instance, between January 2010 and March 2015, Navient 
enrolled more than 1.5 million borrowers in multiple 
consecutive forbearances instead of helping them enroll in an 
IDR plan.  During the same time period, the number of 
borrowers that Navient enrolled in forbearance generally 
exceeded the number of borrowers enrolled in IDR plans.  
Navient representatives would sometimes place borrowers in 
voluntary forbearance even though they would have qualified 
for $0 per month payments in an IDR plan.  Navient also 
unnecessarily placed borrowers in forbearance before 
ultimately placing them in an IDR plan.  The majority of IDR 
plan participants were enrolled in forbearance for more than 
three months before ultimately being enrolled in an IDR plan.  
This resulted in borrowers being adversely affected by the 
addition of interest to the loan’s principal and losing credit for 
months that would have been counted toward loan 
forgiveness.6 
 
6 Amici Curiae the Student Borrower Protection Center and 
joining organizations state that approximately 43 million 
people owe over $1.4 trillion on their federal student loans.  
Amici argue that “the consequences of servicers’ misconduct 
can be catastrophic for struggling borrowers’ . . . lives.”  
Amicus Curiae Br. for Student Borrowers Protection Center et 
al. 2–3.  They further contend that older borrowers, facing 
limited and declining income and less access to technology, 
and borrowers of color (who are over-represented in the 
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b. Issues with Recertification of 
IDR Plans  
Between July 2011 and March 2015, more than 60% of 
Navient’s borrowers who enrolled in IDR plans failed timely 
to renew their enrollment.  From January 2010 to December 
2012, Navient’s annual renewal notices for IDR plans (sent via 
U.S. mail) allegedly did not provide notice of the actual date 
by which renewal applications had to be submitted.  The 
notices stated that the IDR period would expire in 
“approximately 90 days” and that the “renewal process may 
take at least 30 days” to complete.  App. 139.  The 
Commonwealth alleges that the notices failed to advise 
borrowers of the negative consequences of submitting an 
 
student bodies of predatory for-profit schools), are 
disproportionately affected by servicer misconduct.  Id. at 3–4.  
It thus “systematically strips wealth from . . . communities 
which are already economically disadvantaged.”  Id. at 18.  
 
Amicus Curiae the American Federation of Teachers 
(“AFT”) argues that Navient’s alleged schemes have especially 
affected the long-term cost of student loans for public servants, 
like AFT members, many of whom would be on track for the 
Public Student Loan Forgiveness program (the “Loan 
Forgiveness Program”), but who were steered into forbearance 
by Navient.  “Congress created the [Loan Forgiveness 
Program] in 2007, promising to forgive the complete balance 
of federal student loan debt for any public employee who 
makes 120 on-time payments on a qualifying repayment plan.”  
Amicus Curiae Br. for AFT at 5.  Yet, as a result of servicers’ 
misconduct, public employees steered into forbearance by 
servicers made fewer qualifying payments even as unpaid 
interest accumulated on their account.  Id. at 7–16. 
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untimely or incomplete application and of having a break in 
their enrollment in an IDR plan (including an immediate 
increase in monthly payments, accrued interest being added to 
their loan principal, loss of interest subsidies, and delays in 
loan forgiveness). 
Between mid-2010 and March 2015, some borrowers 
had to log into an electronic portal using their username and 
password to view the notices.  Seventy-five percent of 
Navient’s federal loan borrowers agreed to receive electronic 
communications.  Borrowers were sent an e-mail with a 
hyperlink to Navient’s website.  However, the e-mail did not 
provide any indication of the purpose of the notice. 
c. Misrepresentations Related to 
Cosigner Releases  
A cosigner is generally required for a borrower to obtain 
a private student loan.  After a borrower begins repayment, he 
or she can usually apply to release the cosigner after meeting 
eligibility criteria.  As of January 2010, one of the eligibility 
criteria is that the borrower makes a minimum number of 
“consecutive, on-time payments.”  When a borrower makes 
multiple payments at one time, Navient applies the payment 
for the current month and then places the borrower in a “paid 
ahead” status for subsequent months.  App. 144.  The borrower 
is then sent a bill for $0 for the subsequent months covered by 
the excess payment.  However, until mid-2015, Navient 
allegedly treated these “non-payments” as a failure to make 
consecutive payments, reset the clock, and considered the 
consecutive on-time monthly payments as being zero.  This 
increased the number of consecutive payments necessary to 
release a cosigner.  Nothing on Navient’s website, billing 
statements, or other documents provided to borrowers 
indicated that that the clock would be reset.   
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d. Repeated Payment Processing 
Errors 
The Commonwealth alleges that, since at least 2011, 
many borrowers have complained that Navient has 
misallocated or misapplied submitted payments, resulting in 
borrowers and cosigners being improperly charged late fees 
and increased interest charges, and in inaccurate negative 
information being furnished to consumer reporting agencies.  
Many borrowers have complained that, even after getting 
Navient to correct an error, the same payment-processing 
errors occurred repeatedly.  Navient has allegedly failed to 
correct these recurring problems.   
 C. Procedural History  
In October 2017, the Commonwealth filed a complaint 
against Navient alleging its actions in originating and servicing 
student loans constitute unfair, deceptive, and abusive 
practices in violation of both the Consumer Protection Act and 
the PA Protection Law.  The complaint contained nine counts: 
Count I under the PA Protection Law for unfairly and 
deceptively originating risky, expensive loans, which had a 
high likelihood of default, among other unlawful conduct; 
Count II under the PA Protection Law for steering borrowers 
suffering long-term financial hardship into costly 
forbearances; Count III under the Consumer Protection Act for 
steering borrowers suffering long-term financial hardship into 
costly forbearances; Count IV under the PA Protection Law for 
loan servicing failures related to recertification of IDR plans; 
Count V under the Consumer Protection Act for loan servicing 
failures related to recertification of IDR plans; Count VI under 
the PA Protection Law for misrepresentations relating to 
cosigner releases; Count VII under the Consumer Protection 
Act for misrepresentations relating to cosigner releases; Count 
VIII under the PA Protection Law for repeated payment-
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processing errors; and Count IX under the Consumer 
Protection Act for repeated payment-processing errors.   
Nine months before the Commonwealth filed its suit, in 
January 2017, the Bureau, the State of Illinois, and the State of 
Washington filed similar lawsuits alleging, among other 
things, that Navient failed to disclose adequately the 
availability of IDR programs to federal student loan borrowers.  
See Compl., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., et 
al., No. 17-cv-101, 2017 WL 191446 (M.D. Pa., filed Jan. 18, 
2017); Compl., Illinois v. Navient Corp., et al., No. 2017-CH-
00761, 2017 WL 374522 (Ill. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 18, 2017); 
Compl., Washington v. Navient Corp., et al., No. 17-2-01115-
1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 18, 2017).  Navient alleges 
that the Commonwealth’s claims are “a virtual cut-and-paste 
of the [Bureau]’s . . . . complaint.”  Navient Br. 21.  It admits 
that the Commonwealth’s complaint differs in that it 
challenges (A) the pre-2007 loan origination practices of 
Navient’s corporate predecessor (Count I), and (B) Navient’s 
alleged “fail[ure] to disclose a date certain by which a borrower 
must submit materials to recertify an [IDR] plan,” App. 155–
56 (Count IV); Navient Br. 22.    
In December 2017, Navient filed a motion to dismiss 
the complaint for failure to state a claim.  The District Court 
denied the motion in its entirety.  Pennsylvania v. Navient 
Corp., 354 F. Supp. 3d 529 (M.D. Pa. 2018).  First, it rejected 
Navient’s argument that the Consumer Protection Act 
precluded a concurrent lawsuit by Pennsylvania, and it held 
that Section 5552(a)(1) of the Consumer Protection Act, 12 
U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1), unambiguously confers a right on state 
attorneys general to file suit to enforce the Consumer 
Protection Act, and that there is nothing in the Act that would 
bar a parallel state action.  Id. at 543–47.  Second, the Court 
rejected Navient’s preemption argument and concluded that 
the Commonwealth’s claims survived under both express-
18 
 
preemption and conflict-preemption principles.  It held that the 
Commonwealth’s claims were not an attempt to impose 
disclosure requirements on Navient, but were instead distinct 
allegations of unfair and deceptive business practices brought 
pursuant to Pennsylvania’s traditional state police powers.  Id. 
at 548–52.  It then ruled that conflict preemption did not apply 
because uniformity was not an express goal of Congress in 
enacting the Education Act and, even if it were, this goal is not 
defeated by allowing the Commonwealth to enforce its 
consumer protection laws.  Id. at 553.     
The District Court certified to us three questions of law 
for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), see 
Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., No. 17-cv-1814, 2019 WL 
1052014 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2019), and we granted permission 
to appeal two of them, specifically: (1) whether the 
Commonwealth may bring a parallel enforcement action under 
the Consumer Protection Act after the Bureau has filed suit; 
and (2) whether the Education Act preempts the 
Commonwealth’s loan-servicing claims under the PA 
Protection Law.   
II. DISCUSSION7 
A. The Consumer Protection Act Permits 
Concurrent State Claims.  
Navient argues that that Consumer Protection Act does 
not allow the state attorney general to bring a “copycat” claim 
 
7 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1367.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), as we certified two questions of law for 
interlocutory appeal.  “When reviewing an interlocutory appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), we exercise plenary review over 
the question certified.”  Barbato v. Greystone All., LLC, 916 
19 
 
“on behalf of the same borrowers, against the same defendants, 
for the same alleged conduct.”  Navient Br. 25.  Navient 
acknowledges that the Consumer Protection Act expressly 
permits state attorneys general to file Consumer Protection Act 
claims, but argues that they may only do so where the Bureau 
itself has not filed a lawsuit.  To support this interpretation, 
Navient cites the Consumer Protection Act’s requirement that 
state attorneys general notify the Bureau before filing those 
claims and its grant of authority for the Bureau to intervene in 
states’ lawsuits.   
1. The Plain Meaning of the Consumer 
Protection Act Permits State 
Concurrent Actions.  
The plain language of the Consumer Protection Act 
permits state concurrent actions.  Section 5552 provides that 
“the attorney general . . . of any State may bring a civil action 
. . . to enforce provisions of this title . . . and to secure remedies 
under provisions of this title or remedies otherwise provided 
under other law.”  12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1).  Courts typically do 
not look beyond statutory language where the meaning is clear.  
Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2002).  They 
“may look behind a statute only when the plain meaning 
produces a result that is not just unwise but is clearly absurd.”  
In re Visteon Corp., 612 F.3d 219, 220 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation 
and internal quotation omitted).  Here the plain meaning of 
 
F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).  In reviewing 
a motion to dismiss, we likewise review any legal 
determinations anew and presume that a complaint’s factual 
allegations are true.  See James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 
F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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§ 5552 is that the Pennsylvania attorney general may bring an 
action to enforce the Consumer Protection Act.  
 Other provisions of the Consumer Protection Act do 
expressly prohibit concurrent claims, but not § 5552.  Thus, 
under the canon of statutory construction announced in 
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983), “[w]here 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”  Id. at 23 
(citation omitted).  Three other provisions of the Consumer 
Protection Act prohibit concurrent claims.  Section 5514 
prohibits the FTC or the Bureau from filing a civil action 
against a defendant if the other agency has previously filed an 
action against the same defendant based on the same 
“provision of law” and “any violation alleged in the 
complaint.”  12 U.S.C. § 5514(c)(3)(B)(i).  Section 5515 grants 
the Bureau primary enforcement authority over “very large” 
depository institutions and provides “[b]ackup enforcement” 
for the other federal bank regulators to act if the Bureau does 
not.  § 5515(c)(3).  And § 5538 provides for a state’s right of 
action to enforce mortgage rules promulgated by the Bureau, 
but contains an explicit bar on concurrent actions by states 
when the Bureau has already filed its own action against a 
party.  § 5538(b)(6).   
Thus, even if the language of § 5552(a)(1) were 
ambiguous—and it is not—a court should presume that 
Congress’s omission of an explicit prohibition against 
concurrent claims from § 5552(a)(1) was intentional because 
Congress explicitly prohibited concurrent claims in three 
nearby sections of the statute. 
21 
 
2. The Consumer Protection Act’s Pre-
Suit Notice Requirement  
Navient correctly points out that after initially granting 
state attorneys general a right to file Consumer Protection Act 
claims in § 5552(a), the Consumer Protection Act subjects that 
general grant of authority to a limitation: it provides that 
“[b]efore initiating any action,” the relevant state attorney 
general “shall timely provide a copy of the complete complaint 
to be filed and written notice describing such action or 
proceeding to the Bureau.”  12 U.S.C. § 5552(b)(1)(A).  In 
addition to requiring the state attorney general to detail “the 
alleged facts underlying the proceeding,” § 5552(b)(1)(C)(ii), 
the statute requires that official to address “whether there may 
be a need to coordinate the prosecution of the proceeding so as 
not to interfere with any action, including any rulemaking, 
undertaken by the Bureau,” § 5552(b)(1)(C)(iii) (emphasis 
added).   
Navient would have us stretch too far the meaning of 
this pre-suit notice requirement.  It argues that state-sponsored 
Consumer Protection Act claims are intended solely to address 
factual allegations and legal theories of which the Bureau is not 
aware or which are not already subject to a pending Bureau 
lawsuit.  It suggests that in § 5552(b)(1)(C)(iii) “any action” 
refers only to rulemaking and not to other judicial proceedings.  
This fails.  If Congress had intended to limit the phrase “action” 
in § 5552(b)(1)(C)(iii) to mean only “rulemaking,” it could 
have drafted a simpler provision.  Reading “action” to mean 
“rulemaking” only would render the words “any action, 
including” mere surplusage.  Cf. United States v. Miller, 527 
F.3d 54, 62–63 (3d Cir. 2008).   
Moreover, the word “including” “is frequently, if not 
generally, used as a word of extension or enlargement rather 
than as one of limitation or enumeration.”  In re Fed. Mogul-
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Global, Inc., 348 F.3d 390, 401 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation 
omitted).  And Congress twice used the phrase “any action” in 
a manner that includes litigation in a nearby provision: (1) in 
the pre-suit notice provision itself, § 5552(b)(1)(A) (“[b]efore 
initiating any action in court”), and (2) in § 5531(a) (the Bureau 
“may take any action authorized under part E”).   
Navient also argues that § 5552(b)(1)’s notice 
requirement would be superfluous if parallel actions were 
allowed because if the Bureau files a suit, then it knows the 
underlying facts such that there is no need for notice.  This too 
fails.  First, there are many ways in which a parallel state action 
could interfere with the Bureau’s suit and require coordination.  
For example, there could be conflicting discovery schedules, 
conflicting legal theories, or competing settlement offers.  And 
even if there is no conflict between the actions, the Bureau 
benefits from the notice requirement because it could use the 
information to identify additional victims or wrongs, to 
coordinate strategies with the state, or alternatively to drop 
certain counts from its own complaint because the issues will 
be adequately addressed by the state.  Amicus Curiae Br. of the 
Bureau 19–20.   
 Thus, the Consumer Protection Act’s pre-suit notice 
requirement does not negate the statute’s express authorization 
of parallel state actions.8  
 
8 Navient also relies on a not relevant out-of-circuit 
district court case, Navajo Nation v. Wells Fargo & Co., 344 
F. Supp. 3d 1292 (D.N.M. 2018), where the Court dismissed 
Consumer Protection Act claims filed by a tribal government 
when the Bureau had already settled similar claims.  Navajo 
Nation is distinguishable because it was dismissed as res 
judicata.  Id. at 1308.  Nothing in it suggests an implied 
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3. The Consumer Protection Act’s 
Intervention Provision  
Navient does correctly point out that the Bureau is 
authorized to intervene as a party-plaintiff in any state-filed 
Consumer Protection Act litigation.  12 U.S.C. 
§ 5552(b)(2)(A).  It argues that the intervention provision 
demonstrates that Congress intended to prevent concurrent 
state claims.  Yet it fails to cite any case law supporting that, 
where a statute allows third-party intervention, concurrent 
claims are barred.  And indeed, Congress has enacted 
numerous statutes that authorize state enforcement while 
limiting concurrent claims in some way and numerous statutes 
that authorize state enforcement without limiting concurrent 
claims.   Compare 15 U.S.C. § 6103(d) with 49 U.S.C. § 14711.  
That the Consumer Protection Act allows for the Bureau to 
intervene does not clearly decide whether concurrent claims 
are permitted. 
 Navient further asserts that allowing concurrent claims 
would also run headlong into the rule against claim-splitting—
the longstanding bar against having a single party-plaintiff 
simultaneously maintain two actions against the same 
defendant.  See, e.g., Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 
(3d Cir. 1977) (en banc).  However, cases like Walton are 
distinguishable.  There, a single plaintiff filed two separate 
employment lawsuits based on the same underlying facts, in 
the same court, against the same defendant.  Id. at 69–70.  In 
contrast, Pennsylvania and the Bureau are two separate 
plaintiffs with two different lawsuits.  Pennsylvania’s lawsuit 
 
prohibition on concurrent claims under the Consumer 
Protection Act.   
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is intended to protect the public from and remediate violations 
of both Pennsylvania and federal laws.9   
4. Judicial Resources  
Navient also argues that allowing Pennsylvania’s 
concurrent claims will be a waste of judicial resources because 
they, “by definition, cannot achieve anything that the 
[Bureau’s] own lawsuit cannot achieve, no matter how well the 
state litigates its . . . claims.”  Navient Br. at 49.  This argument 
falters for at least three reasons.  First, even if the Bureau 
litigates this case through trial and obtains a judgment, it is 
possible that Pennsylvania could still achieve outcomes 
beyond what the Bureau achieves.  For example, the 
Commonwealth could find witnesses and facts that persuade 
the court to order relief beyond that obtained by the Bureau.  
Second, Pennsylvania and other states have a fundamental 
right to protect their citizens and prevent harmful conduct from 
occurring in their jurisdictions.  The interests of the states and 
the Bureau may not always be completely aligned.  And third, 
states may be able to pick up slack when the federal 
 
9 The parties also dispute whether the Commonwealth 
and Bureau actions can be consolidated and the significance of 
that possibility.  Navient argues that given the nine-month gap 
in the bringing of the cases and the vast disparity in the 
respective procedural postures, it would be impossible to 
consolidate these cases, and at best one action could be stayed 
until the other is resolved, at which point most issues in one 
suit would be resolved by prior decisions in the other case.  
This argument is a distraction.  Navient can only speculate as 
to what will happen if both actions proceed.  It is not clear to 
what extent issue preclusion will apply.  Moreover, that this 
particular case may not be suitable for consolidation does not 
change the plain meaning of the statute.   
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Government fails to enforce and regulate.  If the Bureau were 
under pressure to settle or withdraw its lawsuit,10 states would 
still be free to protect the rights of consumers in their states.   
The District Court correctly rejected Navient’s 
argument that allowing concurrent claims would overburden 
the courts, because although “federal courts are indeed 
inundated with cases, adjudicating this case is a burden the 
Court is required to assume, absent a recognized statutory or 
procedural basis that precludes the Commonwealth from 
bringing its action.”  Navient, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 546.  
 Accordingly, we hold that the clear statutory language 
of the Consumer Protection Act permits concurrent state 
claims, for nothing in the statutory framework suggests 
otherwise.11   
 
10 Indeed, Navient’s CEO has lobbied the Bureau to 
drop its lawsuit.  “Navient CEO Met with CFPB as Company 





11 Navient also raises several constitutional arguments 
not raised before the District Court that go far beyond the 
questions certified by us for interlocutory appeal.  The 
Commonwealth correctly points out that Navient cannot bring 
a freestanding constitutional challenge for the first time in this 
interlocutory appeal.  See Metro. Edison Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, 767 F.3d 335, 352 (3d Cir. 2014) (stating that an 
issue not raised in the district court is waived unless manifest 
injustice would result).  We accordingly do not address its 
constitutional arguments at this stage.   
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B. The Education Act Does Not Preempt the 
Commonwealth’s Claims Under the PA 
Protection Law.  
Navient claims that Section 1098g of the Education Act 
both expressly and impliedly preempts the Commonwealth’s 
state-law claims.  We disagree and follow our sister Circuits in 
holding that the Education Act expressly preempts only claims 
based on failures of disclosure, not claims based on affirmative 
misrepresentations, and that no other preemption principles bar 
the Commonwealth’s claims.  See Lawson-Ross, 955 F.3d at 
911; Nelson, 928 F.3d at 648.  
1. Preemption and the 
Presumption Against 
Preemption  
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. 
art. VI, cl. 2, invalidates any state law that “interferes with or 
is contrary to federal law[.]”  Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 
(1962).  While not “rigidly distinct” categories, there are three 
classes of preemption: (1) express preemption, (2) conflict 
preemption, and (3) field preemption.  Va. Uranium, Inc. v. 
Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1901 (2019) (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 n.6 (2000)); 
Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 
707, 713 (1985).  
Express preemption applies where Congress explicitly 
preempts state law in the statutory language.  See Cipollone v. 
Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).  Conflict 
preemption occurs “when a state law conflicts with federal law 
such that compliance with both state and federal regulations is 
impossible, or when a challenged state law stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of a federal law.”  Id. (internal 
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citations and quotations omitted).  Field preemption focuses on 
when Congress does not expressly preempt state law but where 
“‘federal law leaves no room for state regulation and that 
Congress had a clear and manifest intent to supersede state law’ 
in that field.”  Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 
680, 688 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).  “Where Congress 
expresses an intent to occupy an entire field, States are 
foreclosed from adopting any regulation in that area, regardless 
of whether that action is consistent with federal standards.”  Id.  
Each mode of preemption serves the same underlying function: 
“Congress enacts a law that imposes restrictions or confers 
rights on private actors; a state law confers rights or imposes 
restrictions that conflict with the federal law; and therefore the 
federal law takes precedence and the state law is preempted.”  
Murphy v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480 
(2018). 
“In every preemption case, our inquiry is guided by two 
principles.  First, the intent of Congress is the ‘ultimate 
touchstone’ of preemption analysis.”  Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 
F.3d 97, 115 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).  In discerning congressional intent, 
we look to the “structure and purpose of the statute as a whole, 
as revealed not only in the text, but through the . . . way in 
which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding 
regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law.”  
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 486 (internal citation omitted).  “Second, we 
‘start[ ] with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend 
to displace state law.’”  Farina, 625 F.3d at 116 (quoting 
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).  “[B]ecause 
the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we 
have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-
empt state-law causes of action.”  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485.  The 
presumption applies with particular force when the state is 
exercising its police power.  Id.   
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2. Section 1098g Does Not Expressly 
Preempt the Commonwealth’s Claims 
Under the PA Protection Law. 
Section 1098g provides that “[l]oans made, insured, or 
guaranteed pursuant to a program authorized by Title IV of the 
Higher Education Act . . . shall not be subject to any disclosure 
requirements of any State law.”  20 U.S.C. § 1098g (emphases 
added).   
Navient suggests we begin and end our inquiry with this 
language.  It argues that Counts II and IV of the 
Commonwealth’s Complaint fall squarely within § 1098g’s 
prohibition because they target the sufficiency of the 
disclosures Navient allegedly made to borrowers and expressly 
fault it for failing to make “disclosures” or provide “notice” 
that state law required Navient to provide.  See App. 152 
(Count II) (alleging Navient violated the PA Protection Law 
because “[i]n phone calls[] [it] failed to meaningfully disclose 
. . . that the federal [G]overnment offers IDR plans”); App. 156 
(Count IV) (alleging Navient violated the PA Protection Law 
because it “[f]ailed to disclose a date certain by which a 
borrower must submit materials to recertify an [IDR] plan,” 
and “[f]ailed to adequately notify borrowers . . .  of the 
existence of the renewal notice”).  
The language of § 1098g is indeed broad and 
unqualified; it expressly preempts “any” state claim premised 
on “any” disclosure requirement imposed by state law 
regarding such loans.  However, as noted above, “the presence 
of an express preemption provision does not end the inquiry.  
While it means we need not inquire whether Congress intended 
to preempt some state law, we still must examine congressional 
intent as to the scope of the preemption provision.”  Farina, 
625 F.3d at 118.  To identify the domain expressly preempted 
by Congress, we read “the words of a statute . . . in their context 
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and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”  
Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1748 
(2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
Here, we are persuaded by the Eleventh and Seventh 
Circuits’ recent statements on the scope of the Education Act’s 
express preemption provision.  In Lawson-Ross, borrowers 
brought suit under Florida’s Consumer Collection Practices 
Act against their federal student loan provider for making 
affirmative misrepresentations about their eligibility for the 
Public Student Loan Forgiveness program (the “Loan 
Forgiveness Program”).  955 F.3d at 911.  In determining what 
domain is expressly preempted by the Education Act, the 
Eleventh Circuit explained, 
Section 1098g concerns ‘disclosure 
requirements,’ but the [Education Act] does not 
define ‘disclosure requirements’ or ‘disclosure.’  
The [Education Act] does, however, identify the 
disclosures it requires.  Viewed in its statutory 
context, then, the term ‘disclosure requirements’ 
refers to the [Education Act]’s requirements that 
certain information be communicated to 
borrowers during the various stages of a loan, as 
laid out in § 1083 of the statute.  Thus, the 
domain § 1098g preempts is the type of 
disclosures to borrowers that § 1083 requires. 
Id. at 917 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1083(a), (b), (e)).  The Court 
concluded “that the precise language Congress used in § 1098g 
preempts only state law that imposes disclosure requirements; 
state law causes of action arising out of affirmative 
misrepresentations a servicer voluntarily made that did not 
concern the subject matter of required disclosures impose no 




The servicer in Lawson-Ross, like Navient here, argued 
that borrowers’ affirmative misrepresentation claims were 
actually based on a failure to disclose correct information.  The 
Court rejected this characterization of the claims.  It saw “no 
allegation that [the servicer] failed to provide them with any 
information that it had a legal obligation to disclose.  Rather, 
the [b]orrowers alleged that when [the servicer] chose to 
provide them with information it was not required to disclose 
. . . it gave false information.”  Id. at 918.  The Court found 
“support for this distinction between an affirmative 
misrepresentation and a failure to disclose in the law of torts.  
To succeed on a failure-to-disclose claim, the plaintiff must 
establish that there was a duty to speak and the duty was 
breached.”  Id. at 918 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U.S. 222, 228 (1980)).  “In contrast, a claim alleging an 
affirmative misrepresentation does not rely on a duty to 
disclose.”  Id.  The borrowers’ claims about the servicer’s 
misrepresentations about their eligibility for the Loan 
Forgiveness Program were thus not preempted.  Id. at 919-20.   
 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Nelson held that 
§ 1098g does not expressly preempt state consumer protection 
laws to the extent they target affirmative misrepresentations 
rather than failures to disclose required information.  928 F.3d 
at 647–50.  There a borrower’s state-law consumer protection 
and tort claims alleged that her federal student loan servicer 
made affirmative misrepresentations while counseling her on 
her repayment plan options.  The Court concluded her claims 
were not expressly preempted, explaining that 
[w]e recognize that it would be possible to apply 
state consumer protection laws to impose 
additional disclosure requirements on loan 
servicers of federally insured student loans.  
Such applications would be preempted under 
§ 1098g . . . .  But that result is not necessary or 
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inherent in [the borrower’s] claims, at least to the 
extent she alleges affirmative 
misrepresentations.  We cannot say on the 
pleadings that all of [the borrower’s] claims are 
preempted by § 1098g.  On remand, the district 
court may need to use jury instructions and other 
tools to allow [the borrower] to proceed on her 
claims of affirmative misrepresentations while 
ensuring that the case does not become a vehicle 
for state law to impose new disclosure 
requirements. 
Id. at 650 (internal citation omitted).  The Court explained that 
“[t]he common law tort of fraud ordinarily requires a 
deliberately false statement of material fact. . . .  An omission 
or failure to disclose, on the other hand, will not support a 
common law fraud claim but may be actionable as constructive 
fraud or fraudulent concealment. . . .”  Id. at 649 (internal 
citations omitted).  Because the borrower alleged that the 
servicer “said something false that it was not required to say,” 
the Court concluded that the claim did not imply a disclosure 
requirement.  Id. at 649.   
Both Nelson and Lawson-Ross built on a distinction first 
drawn by the Ninth Circuit in Chae, 593 F.3d 936, wherein 
plaintiffs brought claims under California’s consumer 
protection statute and accused Sallie Mae of both 
“misrepresent[ation]” and “improper . . . disclosure” of 
information to borrowers about federal student loans.  593 F.3d 
at 942–43.  The Court held that the plaintiffs’ attempt to assert 
claims under California law regarding certain billing 
statements and coupon books was expressly preempted by 
§ 1098g of the Education Act, but the plaintiffs were not barred 
from pursuing claims regarding other fraudulent and deceptive 
practices.  Id. at 943.  The Court made clear, however, that 
plaintiffs could not simply “relabel[]” their preempted 
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disclosure claims as misrepresentation claims.  Id. at 943 
(citation omitted).   
We follow these well-reasoned decisions and adopt the 
distinction between affirmative misrepresentation and failure 
to disclosure information as required by the Education Act.  
Section 1098g does not expressly preempt claims to the extent 
they are alleging affirmative misrepresentations rather than 
failures of disclosure. 
 Turning to our case, we are not convinced that all, or 
even most, of the Commonwealth’s claims are based on 
failures of disclosure.  The Commonwealth’s core allegations 
with respect to Counts II and IV are that Navient improperly 
steered consumers into costly forbearances and made 
misrepresentations to consumers regarding the recertification 
of their IDR plans.  This included misrepresenting to 
consumers that Navient would inform them of the date by 
which they needed to renew and misrepresenting the 
consequences of failing to renew.  To the extent the 
Commonwealth faults Navient for failing to disclose or notify 
borrowers of certain information, it does so only because 
Navient’s failure to disclose certain information furthered the 
affirmative misrepresentations Navient voluntarily chose to 
make.  For example, the Commonwealth alleges: 
• Navient’s website misrepresented to borrowers that its 
representatives would help them “make the right 
decision for [their] situation” and “find an option 
that . . . minimizes [their] total interest cost.”  App. 130.   
• Navient misrepresented to a consumer “that her only 
option for loan assistance was a forbearance, despite the 




• Navient gave false information about public service 
loan forgiveness to one borrower, causing the borrower 
to lose out on seven years of payments that could have 
been applied to this forgiveness program but were not.  
App. 136.  
• Navient repeatedly enrolled a consumer in forbearance 
various times over eleven years, allowing nearly 
$27,000 in interest to accrue, despite his later eligibility 
for an IDR plan.  App. 136–37. 
• Navient told a consumer enrolled in IDR who was 
having trouble making payments that “forbearance was 
his only option” when, in fact, “continuing his IDR plan 
would have been a better option for him in the long 
term.”  App. 137.  
• In a notice to borrowers, Navient misrepresented that it 
would notify the borrowers when their IDR plan was up 
for renewal and, at that time, it would provide the 
borrower with a date to submit a new application.  Yet 
the notices it sent did not include this date.  App. 138–
39.  
• In a notice to borrowers, Navient misrepresented that 
the only consequence of providing incorrect or 
incomplete information during the IDR renewal process 
would be a delay in renewal when, in fact, providing 
incorrect or incomplete information resulted in financial 
harm to borrowers.  App. 140. 
• Navient told a consumer that it would send him an 
annual renewal reminder when, in fact, it did not.  App. 




To the extent these allegations hold Navient accountable 
for its affirmative misconduct, they are not preempted.  The 
Commonwealth cannot fault Navient for failing to provide 
consumers with more information about IDR plans or 
recertification, but it can fault Navient for providing 
misinformation. 
Navient attempts to distinguish our case from Nelson by 
arguing that, unlike the voluntary and excessive statements 
there, some of the alleged misstatements it posted were 
required by federal law to appear on its website.  Specifically, 
the Commonwealth alleges that Navient made the following 
statements on its website regarding its ability to help 
borrowers: 
• “If you’re experiencing problems making your loans 
[sic] payments, please contact us.  Our representatives 
can help you by identifying options and solutions, so 
you can make the right decision for your situation.” 
• “We can help you find an option that fits your budget, 
simplifies payment, and minimizes your total interest 
cost.”  
App. 130.  The Nelson Court held nearly identical statements 
were indeed affirmative misrepresentations not preempted by 
§ 1098g because the servicer made those statements 
voluntarily when it could have just remained silent or told the 
truth.  See Nelson, 928 F.3d at 649–50; see id. at 641–42 (“[o]ur 
trained experts work on your behalf” and “[y]ou don’t have to 
pay for student loan services or advice,” as “[o]ur expert 
representatives . . . understand all of your options”).   
Navient does not actually cite to any provision of law 
that would have required it to misrepresent to borrowers that it 
will help them “make the right decision for [their] situation” or 
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help them “minimize[] [their] total interest cost.”  The 
provisions it cites are off point.  Section 1083 of the Education 
Act merely requires that lenders include on a “bill or statement 
. . . the lender’s or loan servicer’s address and toll-free phone 
number for payment and billing error purposes” and “a link to 
the appropriate page of [the DOE’s] website to obtain a more 
detailed description of the repayment plans . . . .”  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1083(e)(1)(H) & (I).  It does not say what statements Navient 
must make on its website.  Navient went beyond providing 
addresses, telephone numbers, and links while affirmatively 
representing that it would help borrowers make the “right” 
decisions and “minimize” their interest payments.   
 All this to say that the District Court correctly 
concluded that the Commonwealth’s complaint alleges 
Navient made numerous affirmative misrepresentations, and 
claims based thereon are not expressly preempted by the 
Education Act.  It is possible that on remand (especially if 
Navient again moves for dismissal) the District Court may 
need to conduct a closer, allegation-by-allegation, assessment 
of which claims in the Commonwealth’s complaint are based 
on affirmative misrepresentations and which are possibly 
based on failures of disclosure.  It would need to do so in the 
first instance in accord with this opinion and Pennsylvania law.  
Lawson-Ross, 955 F.3d at 911, and Nelson, 928 F.3d at 648, 
also provide guidance.12  
 
12 The District Court may also need to consider whether 
the Commonwealth alleges any material omissions, and if so, 
whether those claims would be preempted by § 1098g.  While 
Lawson-Ross, 955 F.3d at 911, and Nelson, 928 F.3d at 648, 
provide insight into the distinction between an affirmative 
misrepresentation on one end, and a failure to disclose on the 




and a material omission.  If, for example, a Navient 
representative told a borrower that her “best option” for 
resolving loan repayment issues was forbearance but failed to 
mention a more appropriate IDR plan, is the failure to mention 
the IDR plan a material omission or an affirmative 
misrepresentation?  If the former, is it also expressly 
preempted by the Education Act?  We decline to rule on this 
issue without briefing by the parties and without first giving 
the District Court an opportunity to assess this issue in light of 
Pennsylvania law.  We also decline to say in the first instance 
whether the Commonwealth alleges any material omissions. 
   
We note that, under Pennsylvania law, to state a claim 
for intentional misrepresentation a plaintiff must allege “(1) [a] 
representation; (2) which is material . . .; (3) made falsely, with 
knowledge of its falsity . . . ; (4) with the intent of misleading 
another . . . ; (5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; 
and[] (6) the resulting injury was proximately caused by the 
reliance.”  Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555, 560 (Pa. 1999) (citing, 
inter alia, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 (1977)).  The 
tort of “intentional non-disclosure has the same elements as 
intentional misrepresentation except[,] in the case of 
intentional non-disclosure, the party intentionally conceals a 
material fact rather than making an affirmative 
misrepresentation.”  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Concealment of a material fact can amount to 
actionable fraud if the seller intentionally concealed a material 
fact to deceive the purchaser.  See Moser v. DeSetta, 589 A.2d 
679, 682 (Pa. 1991); Sevin v. Kelshaw, 611 A.2d 1232, 1237–
1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (“[A]ctive concealment of defects 
known to be material to the purchaser is legally equivalent to 
an affirmative misrepresentation.”) (emphasis in original); see 
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3. Section 1098g Does Not Impliedly 
Conflict Preempt the Commonwealth’s 
State-Law Claims. 
We next turn to Navient’s argument that even if § 1098g 
does not expressly preempt Counts II and IV, ordinary conflict-
preemption principles bar them.  See Geier v. Am. Honda 
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869–70 (2000) (holding that the 
presence of an express preemption clause does not preclude 
“the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles”).  To 
repeat, state laws are preempted if it is impossible for a party 
to comply with both state and federal law or they “stand[] as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373 
(citation omitted).   
The Supreme Court explained in Cipollone that “[w]hen 
Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has 
included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly 
addressing that issue, . . . there is no need to infer congressional 
intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of 
the legislation.”  505 U.S. at 517 (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  The Court relied on the statutory 
canon “of expressio[] unius est exclusio alterius [to include 
 
also Derby & Co., Inc. v. Seaview Petroleum Co., 756 F. Supp. 
868, 876 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (stating that “[t]he failure to disclose 
a material fact amounts to a misrepresentation where 
disclosure would correct a mistake as to a basic assumption and 
non-disclosure amounts to a failure to act in good faith . . . .”).  
But see Martin v. Hale Prods., Inc., 699 A.2d 1283, 1288 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1997) (stating that “[m]ere silence in the absence of 
a duty to speak” does not constitute fraud).  Thus, it appears 
that under Pennsylvania law intentional material omissions are 
treated similarly to affirmative misrepresentations.   
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one is to exclude all others]: Congress’ enactment of a 
provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies 
that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.”  Id.   
We agree with the Eleventh and the Seventh Circuits 
that, per the Supreme Court’s instruction in Cipollone, we need 
not infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws by the 
Education Act.  Both reasoned that “[w]hen Congress has 
explicitly addressed preemption in a statute, an implication 
arises that it did not intend to preempt other areas of state law.”  
Lawson-Ross, 955 F.3d at 920 (citations omitted); Nelson, 928 
F.3d at 648 (same).  The Education Act includes several 
provisions expressly preempting specific areas of state law, 
including § 1098.  See also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1078(d) (state usury 
laws); 1091a(a)(2) (state statutes of limitations); 1091a(b)(2) 
(state law infancy defense).  
We note that the Ninth Circuit in Chae concluded 
otherwise and held that although some of the borrowers’ claims 
were not expressly preempted by § 1098g, they nonetheless 
were implicitly preempted because they posed an obstacle to 
the uniform operation of the Education Act.  593 F.3d at 946-
47.  The Court concluded that uniformity was an intended 
purpose of the Education Act as illustrated by Congress’s 
direction to the DOE to standardize the Indirect Loan 
Program’s forms, procedures, terms, conditions, and benefits 
throughout federal student loan programs.  Id. at 944–45.  It 
reasoned that allowing state law causes of action to proceed 
would conflict with the purpose of uniformity.  Id. at 943, 945. 
We are not persuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion 
that uniformity was an intended purpose of the Education Act, 
and we join the other Circuits that have rejected that idea.  
Lawson-Ross, 955 F.3d at 922; Nelson, 928 F.3d at 651; 
College Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3d 588, 597 (4th Cir. 
2005) (“We are unable to confirm that the creation of 
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uniformity . . . was actually an important goal of the [Education 
Act].”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “To infer pre-
emption whenever an agency deals with a problem 
comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying that 
whenever a federal agency decides to step into a field, its 
regulations will be exclusive.”  Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 717.  
Thus we do not apply preemption from the comprehensive 
nature of a regulation alone.  See N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 
v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973).   
The Seventh Circuit aptly pointed out that Chae’s broad 
language was based on a different sort of claim, relating to the 
method of setting late fees, repayment start dates, and interest 
calculations.  The Nelson Court assumed that “the need for 
nationwide consistency on those sorts of administrative 
mechanics is substantial” and that there “the value of 
uniformity would be more compelling.”  928 F.3d at 651 
(emphasis added).  Allegations of affirmative 
misrepresentations and misconduct stand in stark contrast.  
There is no indication that Congress had the sweeping goal of 
regulating all misconduct that could possibly occur in student-
loan financing and requiring uniformity of all claims 
tangentially related to the Education Act.  “[S]tate law and 
federal law can exist in harmony” under the Education Act, 
Nelson, 928 F.3d at 651, and conflict preemption does not bar 
the Commonwealth’s claims.   
4. Section 1098g Does Not Field Preempt 
the Commonwealth’s Claims under the 
PA Protection Law. 
Navient does not expressly argue that § 1098g preempts 
the field of regulation of student loans, but, to the extent it 
suggests as much, see Navient Br. 31, 35 (describing the 
language of § 1098g as “unqualified” and creating a 
“comprehensive federal regulatory scheme”), we reject that 
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suggestion as well.  Field preemption exists “where Congress 
has legislated so comprehensively [in an area of law] that it has 
left no room for supplementary state legislation.”  R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Cty., 479 U.S. 130, 140 
(1986).  Every Circuit Court to consider the issue has 
concluded that the Education Act does not field preempt the 
regulation of student loans.  See, e.g., Lawson-Ross, 955 F.3d 
at 923; Nelson, 928 F.3d at 651-52; Chae, 593 F.3d at 941–42; 
Armstrong v. Accrediting Council for Continuing Educ. & 
Training, Inc., 168 F.3d 1362, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Keams 
v. Tempe Tech. Inst., Inc., 39 F.3d 222, 226 (9th Cir. 1994).  
And indeed, consumer protection is a field that states have 
traditionally occupied.  See, e.g., California v. ARC Am. Corp., 
490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989) (noting the long history of state 
common-law and statutory remedies against unfair business 
practices); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 
U.S. 132, 146 (1963) (observing that statute to “prevent the 
deception of consumers” was within scope of state’s police 
powers); In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 669 F.3d 128, 137–38 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (noting that consumer protection is part of 
governmental police powers).  
From a practical standpoint, if we were to hold that the 
Education Act preempts state-law consumer protection claims, 
consumers would be left with no protection against unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices by loan servicers because the 
Education Act contains no general prohibition against those 
practices.  Taken to its logical conclusion, Navient’s proposed 
outcome here would mean that servicers would in theory be 
free to mislead consumers provided that they met the 
Education Act’s technical disclosure requirements.  That 
outcome is untenable.  “It is difficult to believe that Congress 
would, without comment, remove all means of judicial 
recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.”  Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984).  Field 
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preemption thus does not apply to the Commonwealth’s 
claims.13 
*    *    *    *    * 
 The Commonwealth’s parallel enforcement action 
against Navient under the Consumer Protection Act is 
permitted by the statute’s plain language, and the Education 
Act does not expressly preempt the Commonwealth’s claims 
under the PA Protection Law to the extent they are based on 
affirmative misrepresentations and misconduct rather than 
 
13 The States argue in their Amicus brief that they are 
well positioned to protect their residents from unfair and 
deceptive practices by student loan servicers.  Many States 
have developed comprehensive systems for tracking and 
responding to complaints from consumers.  In the last five 
years, amici have collectively received and responded to 
thousands of complaints about federal student loan servicers—
including many against Navient.  And the federal Government 
has for decades welcomed the States’ expertise and worked 
with the States to provide active oversight in the student loan 
industry.  For example, the DOE’s regulations and servicer 
contracts expressly require compliance with not only federal 
laws but also state laws.  See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 682.401.  
Starting in 2000, at the latest, the DOE routinely disclosed 
student loan information to state and local authorities that were 
investigating and prosecuting crimes, civil frauds, and other 
violations in the student loan industry.  See Privacy Act of 
1974, 64 Fed. Reg. 72384, 72399 (Dec. 27, 1999); Privacy Act 
of 1974, 81 Fed. Reg. 12081-02, 12083 (Mar. 8, 2016).  
Likewise, the Bureau shares with states information it receives 
in consumer complaints.  Amicus Curiae Br. for States of New 
York et al. 16–17.   
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failures of disclosure.  No other preemption principle stands as 
a bar to the Commonwealth’s claims.  We thus affirm the 
District Court’s well-reasoned ruling.   
 
